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Abstract
Influence diagrams (IDs) are well-known formalisms extend-
ing Bayesian networks to model decision situations under un-
certainty. Although they are convenient as a decision the-
oretic tool, their knowledge representation ability is limited
in capturing other crucial notions such as logical consis-
tency. We complement IDs with the light-weight description
logic (DL) EL to overcome such limitations. We consider a
setup where DL axioms hold in some contexts, yet the ac-
tual context is uncertain. The framework benefits from the
convenience of using DL as a domain knowledge representa-
tion language and the modelling strength of IDs to deal with
decisions over contexts in the presence of contextual uncer-
tainty. We define related reasoning problems and study their
computational complexity.
1 Introduction
A well-known limitation of classical description log-
ics (DLs) is their inability to deal with uncertainty (Baader
et al. 2007). To model different aspects of knowledge
domains where uncertainty is unavoidable, such as in the
bio-medical sciences, many probabilistic extensions of DLs
have been proposed in the literature (Lukasiewicz and Strac-
cia 2008; Niepert, Noessner, and Stuckenschmidt 2011;
Gutie´rrez-Basulto et al. 2017; Riguzzi et al. 2015). Among
them, a prominent example are Bayesian DLs (Ceylan and
Pen˜aloza 2017; 2014b; Botha, Meyer, and Pen˜aloza 2019;
d’Amato, Fanizzi, and Lukasiewicz 2008), which provide a
means for expressing complex probabilistic and logical de-
pendencies between axioms. For example, in these logics
it is easy to express that two axioms must always appear
together, or that if one axiom holds, then the likelihood of
another one holding is some probability p.
The expressive power of Bayesian DL arises from com-
bining a set of (classical) DL ontologies (called contexts)
with a Bayesian network (BN) (Pearl 1988) representing the
joint probability distribution of these ontologies. This al-
lows to reason about the likelihood of a consequence to hold,
given the current knowledge and update the beliefs about the
probabilities of the contexts. However, this remains a pas-
sive attitude towards knowledge, in the sense that nothing is
done with it. In practice, an agent should be able to make
choices depending on its knowledge and observations and
maximize its expected returns. BNs cannot express them.
Influence diagrams (IDs) (Shachter 1986) generalise BNs
to model potential decisions made by an agent and their as-
sociated costs. Consider for example the fictitious disease
idelium, which may remain asymptomatic, and two poten-
tial tests for detecting whether an individual is infected or
not. Test A is cheap, but not very reliable, while Test B is
much more reliable, but expensive and intrusive. The cost of
false positives and false negatives is high. The former due
to the inconveniences it causes in the life of the subject, and
the latter because it can further spread the disease. The joint
probabilities of finding false positives or false negatives in
the presence or absence of symptoms dependent on the test
used can be modelled via a BN. However, an agent would be
more interested in deciding which test to perform, in order to
minimise the expected combined cost of test, intrusiveness,
and false results. Thus, we extend the BN to an ID which
includes the decision node for the test to perform, along
information about the cost of each setting (see Figure 1).
We propose an extension of the Bayesian DL BEL (Cey-
lan and Pen˜aloza 2014a) which allows for agent decision-
making combining influence diagrams with the light-weight
DL EL (Baader, Brandt, and Lutz 2005). We call it ID-EL.
Our main goal is to allow automated decision making in the
presence of uncertainty and domain knowledge.
In ID-EL, the contexts consider the uncertainty in the net-
work, together with the potential choices from the agent and,
obviously, their associated costs. More importantly, the on-
tological knowledge can be used as evidence about the po-
tential context, thus modifying the underlying probabilities,
during the agent decision process. For example, if idelium
causes a green coloration of the bones, we want to add the
knowledge Bone v ∃hasColor.Green which holds only in
case of disease, but not when the subject is healthy. We
study the reasoning problems associated with the selection,
by the agent, of a strategy that minimises its expected cost
given such evidence, together with other relevant tasks.
2 Preliminaries
We first introduce the basic notions of influence diagrams
and the DL EL needed for the rest of the paper.
2.1 Influence Diagrams
Influence diagrams (IDs) (Shachter 1986) are graphical
models which generalise Bayesian networks (BNs) (Pearl
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Figure 1: An influence diagram; D, S,P are choice nodes, TA is a
decision node, and c is the cost node; val(c) = {0, 2, 5, 20, 90}.
The probability table for the node TA is not specified.
1988) by allowing three types of nodes: chance nodes that
reflect the uncertainty of the environment as in BNs; deci-
sion nodes, which express the choices made by an agent in
response to the environment; and a cost node (also called
a utility node), which reflects the cost (or utility) of a given
outcome. From a formal perspective, each of these nodes is a
discrete random variable, and the main difference is how this
variable is interpreted or used within the network. Impor-
tantly, the agent can only influence its own decision nodes,
while chance nodes can be seen as environment attacks.
Formally, an influence diagram is a pair D = (G,Φ)
where G = (V ∪ {c}, E) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG),
whose nodes V are partitioned into two disjoint sets B and
D of chance nodes (or Bayesian nodes), and decision nodes,
respectively, and c is a single cost node. For simplicity, we
assume w.l.o.g. that all nodes in V are Boolean random vari-
ables (RVs).1 The cost node c has no outgoing edges, and
represents a cost function from the valuations of its parent
nodes to a finite set val(c) ⊆ R of values. For a node
v ∈ V ∪{c}, pi(v) denotes the parents of v. Given a decision
node d ∈ D, d-anc(d) is the set of all decision ancestors of
d, and its influence set is
infl(d) := d-anc(d) ∪ pi(d).
WhenD uses the nodes V ∪{c}, we say thatD is an ID over
V . Φ is a class of conditional probability distribution tables
(PDTs) P (v | pi(v)), one for each chance node v ∈ B given
its parents. Note that no probability distribution is associated
to decision nodes, and recall that the node c represents a
function from the class of all valuations of pi(c) to R.
IDs are represented graphically using circles to denote
chance nodes, squares for decision nodes, and a diamond for
the cost node. Figure 1 shows an ID for our fictitious idelium
disease. The probability of getting an infection (D) is 0.3,
and it has highly specific symptoms (S). There are two tests:
Test A (TA) which is cheaper, and Test B (¬TA) which is
more precise. The overall cost depends on whether the di-
agnosis (P stands for a positive diagnosis) is correct, and
which test was used. Seen in this way, an ID are incomplete
BN where some of the nodes are missing their conditional
1In general, chance and decision nodes can be arbitrary finite
RVs, and IDs may have more than one cost node. Considering
only Boolean RVs with a unique cost node greatly simplifies the
notation and presentation, without affecting its generality.
probability tables, given their parents;2 e.g., in Figure 1, the
decision node TA has no associated PDT.
If the missing tables were added to the ID, then one could
derive the joint probability distribution of all the variables in
V using the standard chain rule from BNs
PD(V ) =
∏
v∈V
P (v | pi(v)).
Instead, in an ID, the decision nodes correspond to possible
choices by an agent based on the information available. The
actual response of the agent is called a strategy, and each
strategy has an associated value. Since it is the agent itself
who is making the choices, these can depend on previous de-
cisions made, of which the agent has full knowledge. Hence,
choices depend on the whole influence set of a node.
Definition 1 (Strategy). A (local) strategy on a decision
node d ∈ D is a conditional PDT of d given its influence
set infl(d). A (global) strategy on the ID D is a set of local
strategies, containing one for each d ∈ D. A local or global
strategy is pure if it only assigns probabilities 0 or 1.
We emphasise once again that the strategy at a decision
node does not depend on its parents only, but on its whole
influence set; that is, it depends on its decision ancestors.
Intuitively, we can see the direction of the DAG edges as a
precedence in the choices made. Hence, every decision de-
pends also on the choices made earlier. This can be under-
stood as having implicit connections between the node d and
its influence set. This assumption, known as no-forgetting, is
commonly used in IDs, thus we include it in our formalism.
However, removing it would have no effect over the results
in this work, modulo a smaller size of the tables represent-
ing local strategies. In the ID from Figure 1, a possible pure
strategy S is to assign P (TA | ¬S) = P (¬TA | S) = 1. To
distinguish pure and general strategies, the former are also
called actions. PD(S) denotes the probability distribution
obtained by adopting the strategy S in the ID D.
Clearly, an agent has a very large (in fact, infinite) class
of strategies from which to choose. Which one is better de-
pends on the probability of paying different costs given the
chosen strategy. One usual approach for choosing a strategy
is to try to minimise the expected cost.
Definition 2 (Expected cost). Given a global strategy S on
the ID D, the expected cost of S w.r.t. D is
E[D | S] :=
∑
r∈val(c)
r · PD(S)(c = r).
The example strategy S on the ID D of Figure 1
yields PD(S)(c = 2) = PD(S)(¬D,P,TA) =
PD(S)(¬D,P,TA,S) = 0.7·0.9·0.4 = 0.252 and in general
PD(S)(c = r) =

0.504 r = 0
0.252 r = 2
0.108 r = 5
0.124 r = 20
0.012 r = 90.
2The utility function can be seen as a special kind of probability
distribution over val(c), where probabilities are always 0 or 1.
Hence, expected cost of this strategy is
E[D | S] = 0 · 0.504 + 2 · 0.252 + 5 · 0.108 +
20 · 0.124 + 90 · 0.12
= 4.604.
Strategies in IDs are often targeted to minimising the ex-
pected cost on the resulting network. However, other kinds
of problems can also be considered over these networks;
e.g., finding the most likely cost, or maximising the prob-
ability of the minimum cost. If we limit ourselves to pure
strategies only, then one can verify that the strategy S′
which assigns P (TA | S) = P (TA | ¬S) = 1 max-
imises the probability of observing the least possible cost
0: PD(S′)(c = 0) = 0.63. This strategy also minimises the
expected cost. In general, strategies reflect the response of
the agent to the situations imposed by the environment.
2.2 EL
EL (Baader, Brandt, and Lutz 2005) is a light-weight de-
scription logic, which allows for polynomial reasoning in
standard reasoning tasks. As with all DLs, its main com-
ponents are concepts and roles, corresponding to unary and
binary predicates of first-order logic, respectively.
Let NC and NR be two disjoint sets of concept names
and role names, respectively. EL concepts are built through
the grammar rule C ::= A | > | C u C | ∃r.C, where
A ∈ NC and r ∈ NR. A general concept inclusion (GCI)
is an expression of the form C v D, where C,D are EL
concepts, and a TBox is a finite set of GCIs. We often call a
TBox also an ontology. The semantics of EL is based on in-
terpretations. These are tuples of the form I = (∆I , ·I),
where ∆I is a set called the domain (of the interpreta-
tion) and ·I is the interpretation function which maps ev-
ery concept name A ∈ NC to a set AI ⊆ ∆I and every
role name r ∈ NR to a binary relation rI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I .
The interpretation function is extended to arbitrary EL con-
cepts by setting >I := ∆I , (C u D)I := CI ∩ DI ; and
(∃r.C)I := {δ ∈ ∆I | ∃γ ∈ CI .(δ, γ) ∈ rI}.
The interpretation I satisfies the GCI C v D (denoted by
I |= C v D) iffCI ⊆ DI . It is a model of the TBox T (de-
noted by I |= T ) iff it satisfies all GCIs in T . Intuitively, a
TBox expresses constraints on the interpretation of concepts
and roles in the knowledge domain that is being represented.
Hence, we are only interested in models of the TBox.
Since EL cannot express negations, every TBox from this
logic is consistent; i.e., it has a model. The main reasoning
problem in EL is thus subsumption: given a TBox T , and
two EL concepts C and D, C is subsumed by D w.r.t. T
(T |= C v D) iff every model I of T satisfies the GCI
C v D. Subsumption in EL is in PTime.
In the next section, we combine IDs with EL, where the
knowledge is divided in different contexts, and later study
some of its reasoning problems.
3 IDs and Contextual Ontologies
We now introduce a new logic that combines EL with an
ID to allow reasoning and deriving strategies according to
observed knowledge. The connection between the two for-
malisms is based on adding a contextual annotation to every
axiom, expressing in which circumstances it is required to
hold. This notion of a knowledge base is formalised next.
Definition 3 (KB). Consider three mutually disjoint sets V ,
NC , andNR of contextual variables (or variables for short),
concept names, and role names, respectively. A (contextual)
general concept inclusion (V -GCI) is an expression of the
form 〈C v D : ϕ〉 where C,D are two EL concepts and ϕ
is a propositional formula over V . A V -TBox is a finite
set of V -GCIs. An ID-EL knowledge base (KB) is a pair
K = (D, T ), where D is an ID over V and T is a V -TBox.
As with other existing context-based DLs (Ceylan and
Pen˜aloza 2017; Baader, Knechtel, and Pen˜aloza 2012), the
idea is that a V -GCI is only required to hold when its con-
text ϕ is satisfied. This intuition is formalised via a possible
world semantics using so-called V -interpretations. These
combine classical DL interpretations with propositional val-
uations to link the GCIs with their contexts.
Definition 4 (Semantics). A V -interpretation is a triple of
the form I = (∆I , ·I ,VI), where (∆I , ·I) is an EL inter-
pretation, and VI : V → {0, 1} is a valuation of V . The
interpretation function ·I is extended to complex concepts
as usual in EL.
The V -interpretation I satisfies the V -GCI 〈C v D : ϕ〉
(I |= 〈C v D : ϕ〉) iff VI 6|= ϕ or CI ⊆ DI . It is a model
of the V -TBox T iff it satisfies all V -GCIs in T .
When there is no ambiguity, we omit the prefix V and
speak of e.g., interpretations or TBoxes. Clearly, the proba-
bilistic DL BEL (Ceylan and Pen˜aloza 2017)—which com-
bines a contextual ontology with a BN—is a special case of
ID-EL, in which there are no decision nodes, and the cost
node is ignored (e.g., it may be disconnected from the rest
of the DAG). As in that special case, it is often useful to con-
sider the classical EL TBoxes induced by the valuations of
the variables in V. These correspond to the GCIs that would
need to be satisfied by any model which uses this valuation.
Definition 5 (Restricted KB). LetK = (D, T ) be a KB, and
W a valuation of the variables in V . The restriction of T to
W is the EL TBox
TW := {C v D | 〈C v D : ϕ〉 ∈ T ,W |= ϕ}.
To consider the uncertainty associated with the contexts,
BEL defines a possible world semantics where each world
is associated with a probability that needs to be compati-
ble with the probability distribution of the nodes. In ID-EL
this definition cannot be applied directly, because the actual
probability distribution is underspecified. In fact, recall that
the full distribution depends on the strategy chosen by the
agent. Thus, the notion of probabilistic models must be pa-
rameterised w.r.t. a strategy.
Definition 6 (Probabilistic model). A probabilistic interpre-
tation is a pair P = (I, PI), where I is a finite set of
V -interpretations and PI is a probability distribution over
I. This probabilistic interpretation is a model of the TBox
T if every I ∈ I is a model of T .
Table 1: Interpretation functions and valuations for Example 7.
i Wi SubIi InfIi ConIi DisIi BenIi SafIi
1 {D,S,P,¬TA} {δ} {δ} {δ} {δ} ∅ ∅
2 {D,S,¬P,¬TA} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
3 {D,¬S,P,TA} {δ} {δ} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
4 {D,¬S,¬P,TA} {δ} {δ} ∅ ∅ {δ} {δ}
5 {¬D,S,P,¬TA} {δ} ∅ {δ} {δ} ∅ ∅
6 {¬D,S,¬P,¬TA} ∅ ∅ {δ} {δ} {δ} ∅
7 {¬D,¬S,P,TA} {δ} ∅ {δ} ∅ ∅ ∅
8 {¬D,¬S,¬P,TA} ∅ ∅ ∅ {δ} ∅ {δ}
Table 2: Probability distribution for Example 7.
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
PI(Ii) 0.108 0.012 0.126 0.054 0.252 0.028 0.294 0.126
Given an ID D and a strategy S on D, the probabilis-
tic interpretation P is consistent with D w.r.t. S if for every
possible valuationW of the variables in V it holds that
PD(S)(W) =
∑
I∈I,VI=W
PI(I).
P is a model of the KB K = (D, T ) w.r.t. the strategy S
(denoted as P |=S K) iff it is a model of T and consistent
with D w.r.t. S.
We explain these notions with a brief example.
Example 7. Let Kex = (D, Tex) be the ID-EL KB where D
is the ID in Figure 1, and3
Tex := {〈Subject v Infectious : D〉,
〈Subject v Control : S ∨ P〉,
〈Control v Distance : S〉,
〈Control v Benefits : ¬P〉
〈Subject v Safe : ¬P ∧ ¬S〉 }.
Wex = {D,¬S,TA,¬P} is a valuation of V . The interpreta-
tion Iex = ({δ}, ·Iex ,Wex) with SubIex = InfIex = ConIex =
{δ} and DisIex = BenIex = SafIex = ∅ satisfies the first
three GCIs, but not the last two. Indeed, Wex |= ¬P but
ConIex 6⊆ BenIex , andWex |= ¬P ∧ ¬S but ConIex 6⊆ SafIex
Let now Ii := ({δ}, ·Ii ,Wi), 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 be the
V -interpretations defined by the interpretation functions and
valuations from Table 1. These simple interpretations are
depicted in Figure 2. It is easy to verify that the probabilis-
tic interpretation Pex = (I, PI) given by I = {I1, . . . , I8}
and the distribution PI from Table 2 is a model of Tex
which is also consistent with the strategy S that assigns
P (TA | ¬S) = P (¬TA | S) = 1. Hence Pex is a model
of Kex w.r.t. S.
In this example, we see how domain knowledge is sepa-
rated from the ID. For example, we model that subjects are
put under medical control if they present symptoms or have
3Following the example in the introduction, we could add
〈Bone v ∃hasColor.Green : D〉 to this TBox. We chose not to
do so to simplify the following examples.
δ
Sub, Inf, Con, Dis
I1
{D,S,P,¬TA}
δ
I2
{D,S,¬P,¬TA}
δ
Sub, Inf
I3
{D,¬S,P,TA}
δ
Sub, Inf, Ben,Saf
I4
{D,¬S,¬P,TA}
δ
Sub, Con, Dis
I5
{¬D,S,P,¬TA}
δ
Con, Dis, Ben
I6
{¬D,S,¬P,¬TA}
δ
Sub, Con
I7
{¬D,¬S,P,TA}
δ
Dis, Ben
I8
{¬D,¬S,¬P,TA}
Figure 2: V -interpretations satisfying Tex from Example 7.
been tested positive. Implicitly, in the context of symptoms,
every subject should keep a safe distance. Note that these
are not part of the ID itself, but give us knowledge that holds
in case some of its nodes are made true.
The notion of a model is always dependent on a given
strategy chosen by the agent. This is in line with our general
understanding of IDs. For instance, the strategy of an agent
could be such that some contexts become impossible; e.g.,
the strategy S from Example 7, requires valuations contain-
ing S and TA to have probability 0 (i.e., symptomatic people
are always presented with test B in this strategy). Then, a
model of the knowledge of this agent should disallow any
positive probability in those contexts. As a consequence, the
basic reasoning tasks in ID-EL must also be parameterised
on the chosen strategy. We also note that the requirement for
I to be finite can be relaxed by imposing some additional
constraints in the probability distribution PI. To avoid un-
necessary technicalities, we simply focus on the finite case.
Recall that the choice of a strategy is only a means, and
the actual value of interest is the cost associated to this strat-
egy. We extend this idea and define the cost associated with
V -interpretations and probabilistic models.
Definition 8 (Expected cost). Given an ID D over V, the
cost of the V -interpretation I = (∆I , ·I ,VI) is defined by
c(I) := c(VI |pi(c)), where VI |pi(c) denotes the restriction of
the valuation VI to the parents of c.
Given a strategy S onD and a probabilistic interpretation
P = (I, PI) which is consistent withD w.r.t. S, the expected
cost of P (w.r.t. S) is
E[P | S] :=
∑
I∈I
PI(I) · c(I).
Since the probability distribution in a probabilistic model
must be consistent with the distribution induced by the strat-
egy S, the expected cost of any model of a KB K = (D, T )
w.r.t. S corresponds exactly to the expected cost of D w.r.t.
S. That is, once that the strategy has been chosen, the ex-
pected cost does not depend on the specific model of K, but
only on the probabilities associated to this strategy. Thus,
we can define the expected cost of the KB K w.r.t. S as
E[K | S] := E[P | S], where P is any model of K.
Before moving to the next section, we present the follow-
ing remark. Rather than defining a cost function directly
on the nodes of the network, it sometimes makes sense to
consider this function to be implicitly defined by the prop-
erties of the contexts that the node c can observe. In the
extreme case, all nodes in V are parents of c and defining
the cost function in terms of the contexts obtained by each
valuation avoids having to represent the exponentially large
mapping. A natural choice for such a cost function is the
size of the context. Intuitively, this function would allow
us to express that a smaller context is preferred over a larger
one. Using this function makes sense, for instance, when the
context needs to be transferred or manipulated over an un-
reliable channel. A smaller ontology is preferred to reduce
the risk of errors. However, many other functions can be
considered depending on the application. As an additional
example, if the contexts refer to different levels of granu-
larity of access, then considering the size of the vocabulary
as cost is more relevant, as a larger vocabulary corresponds
to a wider access to the knowledge. We emphasise, how-
ever, that ID-EL does not require the use of any of these
cost functions, or even that the node c is influenced by all
nodes in V. These are just given as concrete examples with
an application-oriented motivation.
4 Reasoning in ID-EL
Before delving into the reasoning tasks for ID-EL, note that
as in the special cases EL and BEL, every ID-EL ontology is
consistent: for every ID-EL KB and every strategy S, there
is a model of K w.r.t. S, which can be built as follows. Let
K = (D, T ) be a KB and S a strategy, and let V be the
set of variables in D. For every valuationW of V , consider
the interpretation IW = ({δ}, ·IW ,W) where AIW = ∅
and rIW = ∅ for all A ∈ NC , r ∈ NR. The probabilistic
interpretationP = (I, PI) with I = {IW | W is a valuation
of V } and PI(IW) = PD(S)(W) is a model of K w.r.t. S.
Hence, we are more interested in reasoning problems related
to subsumptions (as in EL), their probabilities (as in BEL),
but most importantly, their costs.
The first reasoning task that we consider in this setting
corresponds to computing bounds on the expected costs as-
sociated with the models of a given KB K. To this end, we
would like to find an optimal strategy, which minimises the
expected cost w.r.t. D, and a pessimal strategy, which max-
imises this cost. From the previous discussion, it follows
that these bounds correspond exactly to the bounds on the
expected cost of the ID D from K. In order to study the
computational complexity of finding these bounds, we con-
sider their associated decision problem versions.
Problem 9 (Optimal/Pessimal strategy). Consider an ID D
and a value b ∈ R. The optimal strategy problem (D-Opt)
consists in deciding whether there exists a strategy S such
that E[D | S] < b. Dually, the pessimal strategy problem
(D-Pes) is to decide whether there exists a strategy S such
that E[D | S] > b.
As both problems are PSPACE-complete (Littman, Majer-
cik, and Pitassi 2001), their extension to the setting of ID-EL
KBs, must also be PSPACE-complete.
Theorem 10. Given an ID-EL KB K = (D, T ) and b ∈ R,
deciding if there exists a strategy S such that E[K | S] < b
(or, dually, such that E[K | S] > b) is PSPACE-complete.
However, in general we cannot expect a polynomial-space
algorithm to enumerate an optimal strategy. Indeed, even
if we limit the search to pure strategies (which means that
the probability tables for decision nodes is Boolean), every
pure local strategy corresponds to a Boolean function over
the parent variables. It is well known that for every n ≥ 2
there are Boolean functions (and hence, local strategies) that
cannot be expressed with circuits of size smaller or equal
to 2n/2n (Shannon 1949). It is not hard to construct, for a
Boolean function f , an ID whose optimal pure strategy is in
fact f , which translates the hardness result to our setting.
One can also consider the problem of entailment of a
contextual subsumption, or computing the probability of a
subsumption relation to hold. For the latter, as already ex-
plained, one must first instantiate the chosen strategy, as oth-
erwise the probability is not well-defined.
Definition 11 (Probabilistic subsumption). Let K = (D, T )
be a KB, α a context, and C,D two ID-EL concepts. Given
the probabilistic interpretation P = (I, PI), the probability
of 〈C v D : α〉 w.r.t. P and w.r.t. the strategy S over D are
defined, respectively, as
P (〈C vP D : α〉) :=
∑
I∈I,I|=〈CvD:α〉
PI(I), and
P (〈C vK,S D : α〉) := infP|=SKP (〈C vP D : α〉).
In particular, we denote as P (C vP D) the case where
α = true is the universal context satisfied by all proposi-
tional valuations. Iin this case, satisfaction of an axiom by
an interpretation corresponds exactly to the classical defini-
tion in EL, as the condition of violating the context can never
hold.
Recall that an ID together with a strategy forms a BN, and
hence after choosing the strategy, the probability of each in-
stantiation of all the variables in V is fully specified. Still,
one can choose different models for the KB w.r.t. this strat-
egy. Indeed, note that the universal ELmodel which contains
only one element belonging to all concepts and connected to
itself via all roles, or the empty model defined at the begin-
ning of this section, can always be used to build a proba-
bilistic model P such that P (〈C vP D : α〉) = 1 for all
concepts C,D and contexts α. Choosing the infimum in the
definition of the probability of a subsumption is the natural
cautious bound that is guaranteed to hold in all models.
In a decision situation, an agent might observe a fact, and
try to act upon it with the best available strategy. In IDs,
the observations made are modelled through the introduction
of evidence, which formally is just the instantiation of one
(or more) of the chance nodes. In our setting, we are more
interested in observing facts that arise from the ontological
perspective. That is, our knowledge about the context is not
directly accessible through the variables of the ID, but rather
through the consequences that are known to hold.
Hence, rather than observing the behaviour of the ID, we
observe a fact that provides information about the possible
contexts that can still hold. This information obviously also
influences the probability distribution over the underlying
ID, even if the truth value of all nodes in the graph may still
remain uncertain. In practice, when we observe a conse-
quence, we can immediately exclude some cases (i.e., con-
texts) which contradict our observation. The probabilities
of the remaining cases need to be updated accordingly, after
the impossible cases are removed.
Definition 12 (Conditional expected cost). Let K = (D, T )
be an ID-EL KB, S a strategy on D, P = (I, PI) a prob-
abilistic model of D w.r.t. S, and C,D two concepts such
that P (C vP D) > 0. The conditional probability of the
interpretation I ∈ I given the subsumption C v D is
PI(I | C v D) :=
{
0 if I 6|= C v D
PI(I)
P (CvPD) otherwise.
The conditional expected cost of P given C v D w.r.t. S is
E[P | S,C v D] :=
∑
I∈I
PI(I | C v D) · c(I).
Like when dealing with probabilities alone, if one is try-
ing to understand the expected cost given an observation it
becomes important to consider all the possible models of the
KB. Accordingly, we can consider an optimistic or a pes-
simistic approach depending on whether we try to maximise
or minimise this expected cost.
Definition 13. Let K be an ID-EL KB, S a strategy, and
C,D two concepts. The optimistic expected cost E and the
pessimistic expected cost E of K w.r.t. S given C v D are
defined, respectively, by
E[K | S,C v D] := inf
P|=SK
E[P | S,C v D],
E[K | S,C v D] := sup
P|=SK
E[P | S,C v D].
Note that, as mentioned already, for every context it is
always possible to construct an EL model of the context that
satisfies also the GCI C v D. In the models P = (I, PI)
constructed as explained earlier in this paper, it always holds
that PI(I | C v D) = PI(I) for all I ∈ I. In particular,
this also means that E[P | S,C v D] = E[P | S] for all
strategies S. This yields the following result.
Proposition 14. For every ID-EL KB K, strategy S, and
concepts C,D, it holds that
E[K | S,C v D] ≤ E[K | S] ≤ E[K | S,C v D].
This proposition means that the expected cost of a KB
w.r.t. a given strategy—which, as seen earlier, corresponds
to the expected cost of its underlying ID—provides bounds
for the expected costs given an observed consequence. This
can immediately help prune the search space for the opti-
mistic and pessimistic bounds. In addition, it hints at the
idea that these bounds can be found by manipulating the
distribution of the ID. As the following example shows, the
inequalities from Proposition 14 may be strict.
δ
Sub, Inf, Con, Dis
I1
{D,S,P,¬TA}
δ
Ben
I2
{D,S,¬P,¬TA}
δ
Sub, Inf
I3
{D,¬S,P,TA}
δ
Sub, Inf, Ben,Saf
I4
{D,¬S,¬P,TA}
δ
Sub, Con, Dis
I5
{¬D,S,P,¬TA}
δ
Sub, Con, Dis, Ben
I6
{¬D,S,¬P,¬TA}
δ
Sub, Con
I7
{¬D,¬S,P,TA}
δ
Sub, Saf
I8
{¬D,¬S,¬P,TA}
Figure 3: Interpretations forming a model P of Kex such that
E[Kex | S,A v C] = E[P | S,A v C] and E[Kex | S,A v
D] = E[P | S,A v D].
Example 15. Consider again the KB Kex from Example 7.
We have already seen that under the pure strategy S defined
by P (TA | ¬S) = P (¬TA | S) = 1, it holds that
E[Kex | S] = E[D | S] = 4.604.
Consider the evidence Subject v Benefits. Figure 3 de-
picts V -interpretations, which form a probabilistic model
P of Kex with the same probability distribution as in Ex-
ample 7. We check that E[P | S, Sub v Ben] = 60.149.
Note that I2, I4, and I6 entail Sub v Ben, but all other in-
terpretations do not entail it. Hence, P (Sub vP Ben) =
PI(I2) + PI(I4) + P (I6) = 0.094, and the conditional
probabilities are
PI(Ii | Sub v Ben) =

0.012
0.094 i = 2
0.054
0.094 i = 4
0.028
0.094 i = 6
0 otherwise.
ThusE[P | S, Sub v Ben] = 901294+905494+202894 = 69.149.
It is easy to verify that E[Kex | S,A v C] = 69.149. The
worst-case scenario is that we get a cost of 90 (the high-
est possible in our model) with probability 1, thus giving a
expected cost of 90; however, our evidence is such that ev-
ery model satisfying the valuation ¬D,¬P must also satisfy
Sub v Ben. Since the cost associated to this valuation is 20,
the overall expected cost must decrease, as in our model.
Similarly, E[P | S, Sub v Saf] = 1.5. The only V -
interpretations that satisfy Sub v Saf are I4 and I8, which
are associated to cost 5 and 0, respectively, which yields
E[P | S, Sub v Saf] = 5 54180 = 1.5. It follows that
E[Kex | S, Sub v Saf] ≤ 1.5.
Hence, in general the pessimistic and optimistic expected
costs given an evidence do not coincide with the expected
cost of the KB. This example also shows that different models
may reduce or increase the expected cost, in manners that
may not be obvious at first sight.
This example suggests a method for computing the opti-
mistic and pessimistic expected costs. For the former, we
want to maximize the probability of observing the smallest
possible costs, while minimizing the probability of getting
high costs. The dual approach helps us find the pessimistic
expected cost.
Theorem 16. Optimistic and pessimistic expected costs
given C v D can be computed in polynomial space on the
number of nodes of the underlying ID.
Proof. There are exponentially many valuations of the vari-
ables in V , but each of them is linearly represented in the
size of V . For each valuationW , we construct the TBox TW .
Let n be the smallest value in val(c). We construct a prob-
abilistic model P = (I, PI) as follows. For each valuation
W , I contains a V -interpretation IW = (∆IW , ·IW ,W)
such that (i) (∆IW , ·IW ) |= TW , (ii) if c(I) = n then
(∆IW , ·IW ) |= C v D, and (iii) if c(I) 6= n and
TW 6|= C v D, then (∆IW , ·IW ) 6|= C v D. More-
over, PI(IW) = PD(S)(W). It is easy to verify that this is
a model, constructed in exponential time, which minimises
the expected cost. To compute this cost in polynomial space,
we store only one interpretation at a time, and accumulate
the relative cost of each interpretation iteratively. For the
pessimistic expected cost, the proof is analogous, but using
the largest value of val(c) instead.
We are not interested in the expected costs per se, but
rather as a means to identify the best strategy for the agent
to follow under the evidence. We thus have the choices to
minimise or maximise the optimistic or pessimistic expected
costs, yielding four different notions. To reduce the over-
head of the definition, we focus only on minimising these
costs; maximisation can be treated analogously, with just the
obvious modifications in the definitions and techniques.
Definition 17 (Dominant strategies). LetK be an ID-EL KB
and C,D two concepts. The strategy S is called dominant
optimistic if for every strategy S′ it holds that
E[K | S,C v D] ≤ E[K | S′, C v D].
It is dominant pessimistic if for all strategies S′,
E[K | S,C v D] ≤ E[K | S′, C v D].
To avoid confusions, we emphasise that a dominant pes-
simistic strategy minimizes the pessimistic expected cost. In
terms of decision making, such a strategy ensures that in the
worst case, the overall cost remains manageable.
A naı¨ve approach for finding pure dominant strategies
is to enumerate all possible options, bulding the Boolean
functions for each local strategy, and preserving those that
yield the lowest expected costs. In the worst case, there
are doubly-exponentially many such strategies on the size
of V , which makes this naı¨ve approach infeasible, despite
its effectiveness. On the other hand, it is easy to see that
the optimal strategy for the whole network is a special case
of Definition 17, where the subsumption C v D of interest
corresponds to any EL tautology (e.g., A v A).
Consider the decision problems (D-Dom-Opt and
D-Dom-Pes, respectively) associated with Definition 17:
given a KBK, two conceptsC,D and b ∈ R, decide whether
there are strategies S, S′ such that E[K | S,C v D] < b,
andE[K | S′, C v D] < b, respectively. Using an approach
similar to Theorem 16, we can build a polynomial-space al-
gorithm for deciding D-Dom-Opt under pure strategies by
enumerating all valuations of the chance nodes, guessing for
each of them a valuation of the decision variables and com-
puting the minimal cost that arises from each of them. The
only issue is that this needs to be done in a specific order
to guarantee that for equal parent nodes, the same guess is
made always in a decision variable.
Theorem 18. The problems D-Dom-Opt and D-Dom-Pes
are PSPACE-complete for pure strategies.
Proof sketch. PSPACE-hardness follows from Theorem 10
since D-Opt is a special case of D-Dom-Opt. For the up-
per bound, we use the result from Theorem 16: to verify
D-Opt, for every valuation of the chance variables (B), we
can guess (in polynomial time) a valuation of the decision
variables (D) and compute in polynomial space its expected
cost. This gives a non-deterministic polynomial space algo-
rithm, which by Savitch’s theorem (Savitch 1970) yields a
PSPACE upper bound.
Obviously, the PSPACE complexity lower bound holds
also for arbitrary strategies, as it is a more general prob-
lem. The upper bound can be extended to non-pure strate-
gies, as long as they are representable in exponential space;
otherwise, we would not be able to guess them in exponen-
tial time. The biggest problem when dealing with arbitrary
strategies is that there are uncountably many of them, and a
different choice in one decision node may greatly affect the
probability in a node that it influences.
Computing Optimal Arbitrary Strategies
We have previously restricted ourselves to pure strategies.
We now remove this restriction, and investigate the case
where the strategies can be arbitrary; namely, mixed strate-
gies which generalizes the notion of pure strategy. To carry
out our analysis, we incorporate techniques from game the-
ory; these will be sequential forms in extended-form games
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Nisan et al. 2007). In what
follows, we assume basic knowledge of game theory (see
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) for further details).
As mentioned already, an influence diagram can be un-
derstood as an agent making decisions against nature. In
game-theoretic terms, this can be thought of as a two-player
game where the nodes of the influence diagram are parti-
tioned in two sets which belonging to the different players.
In particular, one player (which we call the first player or
Player 1), is the agent endowed with the decision nodes
and the cost function (implemented by our cost node) and
the other player (the second player) is nature endowed with
chance nodes. Player 1 has a preference between different
outcomes determined by the (expected) cost while Player 2
is indifferent between any outcome.4 This interpretation will
4This can be implemented by any cost function whose
codomain is a singleton.
Figure 4: The game tree obtained from Figure 1.
help us make use of any formal tool which is used to find
(Nash) equilibria (i.e., a state where both players minimize
their cost function concurrently. The reason is that, in such a
setting, the equilibrium notion boils down to the case where
it is dependent only on a single player, namely the case in
which Player 1 minimizes their cost function.
To incorporate the techniques from extended-form games
for a given influence diagram D, we construct a game tree
GD = (Vg, Eg) from D. As this process is quite intuitive, to
avoid cumbersome technicalities, we give a rather brief and
informal description:
(i) for every chance and decision node in the ID, add a node
and label it by the player that controls it i.e., 1 if it is a
decision node and 2 if it is a chance node;
(ii) add a directed edge for every value of that node where the
source is the player which controls the value of that node
and the target is the node (player) which controls the child
node in the ID; and
(iii) add a leaf node for every value of the cost node respecting
the path in the ID.
For simplicity, we assume w.l.o.g. that players are alternat-
ing. Dropping this assumption does not affect our analysis,
since it can easily be converted to such a form: if several
nodes of the same type are consecutive, they can be replaced
by a single non-binary random variable.
Consider for example the game tree obtained by trans-
forming the influence diagram in Figure 1, which is depicted
in Figure 4. Observe that every non-terminal node is la-
beled by the player which controls it in the influence dia-
gram. Moreover, shapes of the node for players correspond
to the shape of the nodes (i.e., 1 and 2) that they control in
the ID. In parallel, leaf nodes ` ∈ L which represent out-
comes are diamond-shaped. Since the root node in the ID
(in Figure 1), player 2 (nature) is the root node in the game
tree.
We introduce some necessary notions for computing the
cost minimization problem with arbitrary strategies. A move
ω is an edge in the game tree, and corresponds to a value of
a particular decision node in an ID i.e., ω ∈ val(d). A se-
quence σ is a path (a sequence of moves) in the game tree.
For example, the empty sequence ∅ and DS¬PTA are se-
quences in Figure 4. A sequence of player i is the sequence
σi of its moves along the game tree e.g., DS¬P for σ2 and
TA for σ1. We denote all possible sequences of Player 1
and Player 2, by S1 and S2, respectively. Given a leaf node
` ∈ L, we denote the sequence which reaches ` by σ(`), and
σi(`) denotes the sequential moves of Player i. We refer to
the content of such a leaf, as c(`) ∈ val(c), after the cost
function c.5
An information set is a set of nodes in which a player has
the same moves e.g., oval h in Figure 4. In our case, we col-
lapse information sets to singletons since Player 1 (the agent
in ID) has access to the conditional probability distribution
of each chance node. In game-theoretic terms, this corre-
spond to perfect information game where Player 1 can ob-
serve what Player 2 has chosen. We denote available moves
for a player i in an information set h as Ωh which corre-
sponds to values of a particular node d in the ID, and the set
of its information sets as Hi. If both players can remember
all of their moves along the path of the game tree, the game
has perfect recall. Intuitively, it means that no player can get
additional information about their position in the game three
by remembering earlier actions. Observe that this is indeed
inline with our initial assumption of no forgetting.
We translate the conditional distributions in the ID to the
game tree in a way that it simulates the overall behaviour
faithfully. We use the well-known notion of behaviour strat-
egy in extended-form games. A behaviour strategy is a prob-
ability distribution β on the next available moves in a state in
the game tree. For instance, in Figure 4, the probability that
the move DS¬P is taken can be chosen w.r.t. the ID in Fig-
ure 1 and the strategy S, which would be, then, 0.012. Hence
β2(DS¬P) = 0.012 where β2 is the behavior strategy for
Player 2. Obviously, a behaviour strategy βi for player i sat-
isfies the following:
∑
ω∈Ωh βi(ω) = 1 and βi(ω) ≥ 0 for
all h ∈ Hi, ω ∈ Ωh. Then by extending behaviour strategies
to sequences, we obtain realization probability of a sequence
σ of Player i under βi: βi(σ) := Πω∈σβi(ω) which is in line
with the standard chain rule. Note that βi(∅) = 1 for any βi.
In terms of the game tree, the expected cost (in Definition 2)
can be rewritten as∑
`∈L
c(`) · β1(`) · β2(`). (1)
Moreover, given a h ∈ H and a sequence σω being an ex-
tension of sequence σ ∈ h with a move ω, then we define
βi(σ) := Σω∈hβi(σω). (2)
We define βi(σ′) = 0 for any non-realizable sequence
σ′. Then any µ1 being a vector value of such a β1 (hence
for Player 1) is called a realization plan.6 This is analo-
gous for Player 2, but since it is indifferent for any outcome,
and observing that its realization plan is fixed,7 considering
only the expected cost minimization of Player 1 fulfills our
goals. We can represent the cost of player 1 in terms of a
cost matrix C, as follows. For every leaf node ` ∈ L in GD,
5Traditionally, one would write c1(`) to denote the cost of
Player 1 in `. We drop this since we are interested in a single player.
6This extension of β is a mixed-strategy (over S1). By Kuhn’s
theorem (Maschler, Solan, and Zamir 2013), if a player has perfect
recall, then a mixed strategy is equivalent to a behaviour strategy.
7Indeed, this is the case since given an ID, chance nodes have
certain distributions which can be considered as a fixed global strat-
egy realizing µ2.
the entries cσ1(`)σ2(`) := c(`) construct a |S1| × |S2| ma-
trix. The expected cost of Player 1 is µ>1 (Cµ2) where µ1 is
the realization plan of Player 1 (a global strategy), C is the
cost matrix, and µ2 is the realization plan of nature (chance
nodes).
We now have all we need to formulate the expected cost
minimization problem of Player 1 in terms of linear con-
straints. Given a fixed realization plan µ2,
minµ1(Cµ2) subject to R · µ1 = r, µ1 ≥ 0 (3)
where R is the matrix for realization constraints i.e.,
columns correspond to elements of S1, and rows are of size
|H1| + 1. Intuitively, the first row of R and r implements
βi(∅) = 1, and the remaining rows implement Equation 2
in the form of for −β1(σ) +
∑
ω∈Ωh β1(σω) = 0 for ev-
ery h ∈ H1 and 0 is the zero vector. And optimal mixed-
strategy is a strategy that is a solution for the LP given in
Equation 3. Realize that the size of LP is linear in the size
of the game tree. However, game tree grows exponentially
for a given ID, realising every valuation of its conditional
dependency tables. Hence, hardness remains. In paral-
lel, recall that mixed-strategies also include pure strategies.
Hence, PSpace-completeness remains. Yet one can easily
modify the LP given above to fully-mixed strategies by set-
ting µ1 > 0 i.e., requiring every component of the strategy
to be greater than zero. To apply these results to ID-EL, we
simply modify the linear program to consider the evidence
of the context that is given by the observations of the results.
Hence, all problems are still solvable in polynomial space.
5 Related Work
In addition to the probabilistic logics mentioned in the in-
troduction, some earlier works (Acar, Thorne, and Stuck-
enschmidt 2015; Acar et al. 2017) employed (probabilistic)
DLs in a decision-theoretic setting. However, neither ad-
dressed observations, nor contextual reasoning. Hence, they
stay completely orthogonal to our work.
Earlier work (Koller and Milch 2003; Zhou, Lu¨, and Liu
2013) has used IDs in a game-theoretic setting, yet in a dif-
ferent direction: to represent sequential games with more
than n ≥ 2 players compactly and to solve them. We bor-
row (in Section 4) the notion of game-tree from game theory
to compute arbitrary strategies in IDs. There we simulate
the ID as a 2-player game (against nature) in a game-tree,
which allows us to employ linear programming based solu-
tion. These works also do not consider contextual reasoning
(since this is not their motivation). To our knowledge, the
closest work is (Ceylan and Pen˜aloza 2014a) which is of no
surprise, since we propose its decision-theoretic extension.
6 Conclusions
We introduced ID-EL, a new extension of the light-weight
DL EL capable of modeling and dealing with decision sit-
uations under uncertainty. This is achieved by integrating
an influence diagram to represent the uncertainty, potential
decisions, and the overall costs of a choice into the knowl-
edge base. The ontological (EL) portion and the influence
representation are combined through the use of contexts,
which express the situations in which knowledge is required
to hold. From an abstract point of view, we build a collec-
tion of ontologies, which are necessarily true only in specific
contexts; but, in line with the open-world assumption, could
still be verified in other situations. These ontologies con-
tain only certain knowledge (i.e., there is no mention of un-
certainty within the ontological knowledge), but the specific
context under consideration is uncertain.
Extending the basic idea of the probabilistic DL BEL,
our framework allows for an agent to influence its context
through choices in specific nodes of the network, trying to
minimise the overall expected cost over the network. Intu-
itively, this means minimising the probability of large costs,
and maximising the probability of low costs. Obviously, the
framework remains uncertain, and there is no absolute guar-
antee that the observation of the environment do yield the
lowest possible cost. But the agent can only influence its
own choices, not those of the environment.
For this paper, we studied the basic reasoning problems
in this logic, and gave tight complexity bounds for all of
them. Interestingly, the decision problem associated with
finding a dominating optimal strategy, in which the agent
should find the best strategy conditioned on an ontologi-
cal observation, remains PSPACE-complete, just as in mak-
ing inferences over an ID. A practical algorithm for solv-
ing this problem—and its effective implementation—is left
for future work. As future work we will also consider other
decision-based reasoning tasks, and complexity classes. No-
tably, we will study whether optimal strategies or costs can
be approximated efficiently, and whether reasoning becomes
tractable over some given parameters. We note that this
is still an open problem even for the special case of BEL.
For example, inferences on a Bayesian network are tractable
over a bounded tree-width, but this property is lost in the
currently known algorithms for reasoning in BEL (Ceylan
and Pen˜aloza 2014c).
Another task to consider is that of building strategies iter-
atively, as a response to the environment; this is justified by
the no-forgetting assumption of IDs, and allows an agent to
react to newer observations, rather than designing an over-
all strategy from the beginning. Some of the complexity is-
sues highlighted in this paper can be alleviated in this way.
Another interesting issue to resolve is how to dislodge the
strategies from the underlying ID, and allow the agent to se-
lect consequences (rather than direct contexts) instead.
To conclude, we note that the choice of EL as a logical for-
malism is motivated by its polynomial-time reasoning prob-
lems, which allow us to understand complexity issues bet-
ter. Likewise, considering TBoxes exclusively, without the
addition of ABoxes was a design choice to simplify the in-
troduction of the formalism. However, our framework can
be combined with other (potentially more expressive) log-
ics, akin to what was done for Bayesian DLs (Ceylan and
Pen˜aloza 2017; Botha, Meyer, and Pen˜aloza 2019). Build-
ing those extensions introduces further problems (e.g., con-
sistency) that would need to be studied in detail as well.
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